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Dying to Win - Wikipedia. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism is Robert Pape's analysis of suicide terrorism from a strategic, social, and psychological point of view. It is based on a database he has compiled at the University of Chicago, where he directs the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism. The book's conclusions are based on data from 3. Of these, 3. 01 were classified into 1.
Published in May 2. Pape's volume has been widely noticed by the press, the public, and policymakers alike, and has earned praise from the likes of Peter Bergen, Congressman Ron Paul (R- Texas). The Growing Threat. Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland. It is important that Americans understand this growing phenomenon (4. Explaining Suicide Terrorism.
Pape distinguishes among demonstrative terrorism, which seeks publicity, destructive terrorism, which seeks to exert coercion through the threat of injury and death as well as to mobilize support, and suicide terrorism, which involves an attacker's actually killing himself or herself along with others, generally as part of a campaign (9. Three historical episodes are introduced for purposes of comparison: the ancient Jewish Zealots (1. There was no suicide terrorism from 1. They found 3. 15 incidents, beginning with the 1. Beirut barracks bombing (1.
They were able to classify all but 1. Muslim, Hindu or Sikh religious persuasion. These included the Tamil Tigers (July 1. Israeli occupation of Palestine (1. Persian Gulf (1. 99. Turkey (1. 99. 6), Chechnya (2. Kashmir (2. 00. 0), and the U.
S. Five campaigns were still ongoing in early 2. Dying to Win was being written (1. Economic explanation of this phenomenon yields . Explanation of suicide terrorism as a form of competition between radical groups is dubious (1. All 1. 8 campaigns shared two elements: (1) a foreign occupation (2) by a democracy. Only one of the 1. Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey.
A Strategy for Weak Actors. As a weapon of weak groups incapable of . Targeting Democracies. Patterns of timing (3. Foreign occupation is defined in terms of control of territory (not military occupation alone) (4.
The targets selected by suicide terrorists suggests nationalist, not religious, aims (4. In general, the harshness of occupation does not strongly correlate with suicide terrorism (5. Learning Terrorism Pays. Hamas's success is difficult to evaluate, but Hamas spokespersons express belief in their own success (6.
Terrorists learn from each other; the spread of the method is therefore neither irrational nor surprising (7. But suicide terrorism has failed . Occupation and Religious Difference.
This explains how the local community can be persuaded to re- define acts of suicide and murder as acts of martyrdom on behalf of the community (8. Pape proposes a nationalist theory of suicide terrorism, seen from the point of view of terrorists. He analyzes the notions of occupation (8. A statistical demonstration leads to the conclusion that a . However, different future developments of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism are very possible, and more study of the role of religion is needed (1. Ch. 7: Demystifying al- Qaeda.
The nature of Salafism, a Sunni form of Islamic fundamentalism, is complex (1. Statistical analysis fails to corroborate Salafism- terrorism connection, but it does corroborate a connection to U. S. Al- Qaeda propaganda emphasizes the . Suicide Terrorist Organizations around the Globe. He offers detailed analyses of Lebanon (1. Altruism and Terrorism. Analytical difficulties are acknowledged (1.
Pape uses suicide rates in general as points of comparison (1. Team suicide, which is frequent in suicide terrorism, is an indicator of altruistic suicide, he argues (1. Altruistic suicide is a socially constructed phenomenon (1. The altruistic nature of suicide terrorism suggests the number of potential terrorists is large, that suicide terrorism is capable of growing in attractiveness and appeal, and that any attempt at profiling will miss a substantial number of potential suicide terrorists (1. The Demographic Profile of Suicide Terrorists. Pape discusses problems of data- gathering (2.
He establishes 4. Hezbollah suicide bombers in the period 1. In general, suicide terrorists are in their early 2. Females are fewer in Islamist groups: . Female suicide terrorists tend to be older than male (2. There is no documented mental illness in any case of suicide terrorism, though there are 1. Arab suicide terrorists are in general better educated than average and are from the working or middle classes (2.
Portraits of Three Suicide Terrorists. Pape looks at three individual cases: Mohamed Atta (2. A New Strategy for Victory. He rejects Frum- Perle view that the root of the problem is in Islam (2. The notion that Islamic fundamentalism is bent on world domination is .
An attempt by the West to force Muslim societies to transform . He calls for a policy of . Salafism is defined as . Sunni Countries with Salafi- Influenced Populations: Afghanistan (1. Pashtuns); Algeria (1. Sunni Muslims); Bangladesh (1.
Egypt (2. 3 m/6. 2m); Indonesia (2. Jordan (2 m/6m); Nigeria (3. Oman (2 m/2m); Pakistan (4. Saudi Arabia (1. 8 m/1. Somalia (5 m/1. 0m); Sudan (2. Tunisia (5 m/1. 0m); Yemen (8 m/1. Non- Salafi Sunni Countries: Albania, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan (2.
Clinton, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay from Princeton charge Pape with . Appendix II lists 5. An analysis explaining the difference between the 9 with suicide terrorism and the 4.
In response, Pape argues that his research design is sufficient because it collected the universe of known cases of suicide terrorism. That premise is that suicide terrorism is mainly a product of Islamic fundamentalism. Retrieved Jun 1. 0, 2. Retrieved Jun 1. 0, 2.